There are yet remaining many Things concerningGods Attributes, and many things concerning thenatureofmy selfor of myMind, which ought to be searched into: but these perhaps I shall set upon at some other Opportunity. And at Present nothing seems to me more requisite (feeling I have discover’d what I mustavoid, and what I mustDofor theAttainingofTruth) then that I imploy my Endeavours to free my self from those doubts into which I have latelyfallen, and that I try whether I can have any certainty of Material Things.

But before I enquire whether there be any such thingsReally Existent withoutMe, I ought to consider theIdeasof those things, as they are in my Thoughts and try which of them areDistinct, whichconfused.

In which search I find that Idistinctly imagine Quantity, that which Philosophers commonly callcontinued, that is to say, theExtensionof thatQuantityor thingcontinuedintoLength,Breadth, andThickness, I cancountin it divers Parts, to which parts I can assignBigness,Figure,Position, andLocal Motion, to whichLocal MotionI can assignDuration. Neither are only theseGeneralsplainly discover’d and known by Me, but also by attentive Consideration, I perceive Innumerableparticularsconcerning theShapes,Number, andMotionof These Bodies; TheTruthwhereof is soevident, andagreeableto myNature, that when I first discover’d them, I seemed not so much to haveLearntany thing that isnew, as to have onlyremembredwhat I have knownbefore, or only to have thought on those things which were in mebefore, tho this bethe first time that I have examin’d them sodiligently.

One thing there is worthy my Consideration, which is, that I find in my self innumerableIdeasof certain things, which tho perhaps theyexist no where withoutMe, yet they cannot Be said to beNothing; and tho they areThoughtupon by me at mywillandpleasure, yet they are notmadebyMe, but have their ownTrueandImmutable Natures. As when, for example,*IImagineaTriangle, tho perhaps such aFigure Exists no whereout of myThoughts, nor everwill Exist, yet theNaturethereof isdeterminate, and itsEssenceor Form isImmutableandEternal, which is neithermadeby me, nordependson my mind, as appears for that manypropertiesmay bedemonstratedof this Triangle,viz.That its three Angles are equal to two right ones, that to its Greatest Angle the Greatest side is subtended, and such like, which I nowclearlyknow whetherI will or not, tho beforeInever thought on them, when Iimaginea Triangle, and consequently they could not be invented by Me. And ’tis nothing to the purpose for me to say, that perhaps thisIdeaof aTriangle came to me by the Organs ofsense, because I have sometimes seen bodies of aTriangular Shape; for I can think of Innumerable otherFigures, which I cannot suspect to have come in through mysenses, and yet I canDemonstratevariouspropertiesof them, as well as of aTriangle, which certainly are alltrue, seeing I know themclearly, and therefore they aresomething, and not a meerNothing, for ’tis Evident thatwhat is true is something.

And now I have sufficiently Demonstrated, thatwhat I clearly perceive, is True; And tho I hadnot demonstratedit, yet such is theNatureof myMind, that I could not but give myAssentto what Isoperceive, at least, as long as Isoperceive it; and I remember (heretofore when I most of all relied onsensible Objects) that I held thoseTruthsfor the mostcertainwhich Ievidentlyperceived, such as are concerningFigures,Numbers, with other parts ofArithmetick, andGeometry, as also whatever relates topureandabstracted Mathematicks.

Now therefore, if from this alone,That I can frame the Idea of a Thing in my Mind, it follows,That whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive belonging to a thing, doesReally belong to it; Cannot I from hence draw an Argument to Prove theExistenceof aGod? Certainly I find theIdeaof aGod, orinfinitely perfect Being, asnaturallyin me, as theIdeaof anyFigure, orNumber; and I asclearlyanddistinctlyunderstand that it appertains to hisNature Always to Be, as I know that what I candemonstrateof aMathematical FigureorNumberbelongs to theNatureof thatFigureorNumber: so that, tho all things which I haveMeditatedupon these three or four days were nottrue, yet I may well be ascertainof theExistenceof aGod, as I have hitherto been ofMathematical Truths.

Doubt.Yet this Argument at first sight appears not soevident, but looks rather like asophism; for seeing I am used in all other things toDistinguish ExistencefromEssence, I can easily perswade my self that theExistenceofGodmay bedistinguish’dfrom hisEssence, so that I mayImagine Godnot toExist.

Solution.But considering it more strictly, ’tis manifest, that theExistenceofGodcan no more beseperatedfrom hisEssence, then theEqualityof theThree Anglestotwo right onescan beseperatedfrom theEssenceof aTriangle, or then theIdeaof aMountaincan bewithouttheIdeaof avalley; so that ’tis no less aRepugnancyto think of aGod(that is,A Being infinitely perfect) who wantsExistence(that is, who wants aPerfection) then to think of aMountain, to which there isno Valley adjoyning.

Doubt.But what if I cannot imagineGodbut asExisting, or aMountain without a Vally? yet supposing me to think of aMountain with a Vally, it does not from thence follow, that thereIs a Mountainin the World; so supposing me to think of aGodasExisting, yet does it not follow thatGod Really Exists. For myThought imposesnonecessityon Things, and as I may imagine aWinged Horse, tho noHorsehasWings, so I may imagine anexisting God, tho noGod exist.

Solution.’Tis true theSophismseems to lie in this, yet tho I cannot conceive aMountainbut with aVally, it does not from hence follow, that aMountainorVallydoExist, but this will follow, that whether aMountainor aVally doordo not Exist, yet they cannot beseperated: so from hence that I cannot think ofGodbut asExisting, it follows thatExistenceisInseperablefromGod, and therefore that heReally Exists; Not because myThoughtdoes all this, orImposesanynecessityon any Thing, but contrarily, because thenecessityof the thing it self (viz.ofGods Existence)Determinesme tothinkthus; for ’tis not in my Power to think aGodwithoutExistence(that is,A Being absolutely perfectwithout theCheif Perfection) as it is in my Power to imagine a Horse eitherwithorwithout Wings.

Doubt.And here it cannot be said, that I am forced to supposeGod Existing, after I have supposed himendowedwith allPerfections, seeingExistenceis one of them; but that myFirst Position(viz.HisAbsolute Perfection) is notnecessary. Thus, for example, ’tis notnecessaryfor me to think allQuadrilateral Figuresinscribed in aCircle; But supposing that I thinkso, I am thennecessitatedto Confess aRhombe Inscribedtherein, and yet this is evidentlyFalse.

Solution.For tho I am not forced at any time to think of aGod; yet as often as I cast my Thoughts on aFirstandCheif Being, and as it were bring forth out of the Treasury of my Mind anIdeathereof, I must of necessity attribute thereto all Manner ofPerfections, tho I do not at thattimecountthem over, orRemarkeach single One; whichnecessityis sufficient to make me hereafter (when I come to considerExistenceto be aPerfection) concludeRightly, That the First and Chief Being does Exist. Thus, for example, I am not obliged at any time to imagine aTriangle, yet whenever I please to Consider of aRight-lined Figurehaving onlythree Angles, I am thennecessitatedto allow it all thoseRequisitesfrom which I may argue rightly,That the Three Angles thereof are not Greater then Two Right Ones, Tho upon the first consideration this came not into my Thought. But when I enquire what Figures may beinscribedwithin aCircle, I am not at allnecessitatedto think that allQuadrilateral Figuresare of that sort; neither can I possibly imagine this, whilst I admit of nothing, but what IclearlyanddistinctlyUnderstand: and therefore there is a great Difference between theseFalse suppositions, andTrue natural Ideas, thefirstandChief; whereof is that of aGod; For by many wayes I understandThatnot to be aFiction dependingon myThought, but anImageof aTrueandImmutable Nature; As first, because I can thinkof no other thing butGodto WhoseEssence Existencebelongs. Next because I cannot ImagineTwoorMore Gods, and supposing that he isnowonly One, I may plainly perceive itnecessaryforHimtoHave been from Eternity, andwill Be to Eternity; And Lastly because I perceive many Other Things inGod, Which I cannotChange, and from which I cannotDetract.

But whatever way of Argumentation I use, it comes All at last to this one Thing, That I am fully perswaded of theTruthof those things only, which appear to meclearlyanddistinctly. And tho some of those things, which I so perceive, are obvious toeveryMan, and some are only discover’d by Those that search morenighly, and enquire morecarefully, yet when suchtruthsare discover’d, they are esteem’d no lesscertainthan the Others. For Example, Tho it do not so easily appear, that in a Rightangled Triangle, the square of the Base is equal to the squares of the sides, as it appears, that the Base is suspended under its Largest Angle, yet thefirst Propositionisno less certainlybelieved when once ’tis perceived, then thisLast.

Thus in Reference toGod; certainly, unless I am overrun withPrejudice, or have my thoughts begirt on all sides withsensible Objects, I should acknowledge nothingbeforeoreasierthen him; For what is moreself-evidentthen that there is aChief Being, or then that aGod(to whoseessence alone Existenceappertains) doesExist? And tho serious Consideration is required to perceive thus much, yetNow, I am not only equallycertainof it, as of what seems mostcertain, but I perceive also that theTruthof other Things sodependson it, that without it nothing can ever beperfectly known.

For tho mynaturebesuch, that during the time of myClearandDistinctPerception, I cannot but believe ittrue; yet myNatureissuchalso, that I cannot fix theIntentionof myMindupon one and the same thing alwayes, so as to perceive itclearly, and the Remembrance of whatJudgementI have formerly made is often stirred up, when I cease attending to those reasons for which I passed such a Judgment, other Reasons may then be produced, which (if I did notknow God) may easilymoveme in myOpinion; and by thismeans I shall never attain to thetrueandcertain Knowledgeof any Thing, butWandringandUnstable opinions. So, for example, when I consider the Nature of a Triangle, it plainly appears to me (as understanding the Principles of Geometry) that its three Angles are equal to two right ones; And this I must of necessity thinkTrueas long as I attend to theDemonstrationthereof; but as soon as ever I withdraw my Mind from theConsiderationof itsProof(altho I remember that I have onceClearlyperceived it) yet perhaps I maydoubtof ItsTruth, being as yetIgnorantof aGod; For I may perswade my self, that I am so framed byNature, as to bedeceivedin those things which I imagine my self to perceive mostevidently, Especially when I recollect, that heretofore I have often accounted many thingsTrueandCertain, which afterward upon other Reasons I have Judged as False. But when I perceive that there is aGod; because at the same time I also Understand that all thingsDependon Him, and that he is not aDeceiver; and when from hence I Collect that all those Things which Iclearlyanddistinctlyperceive arenecessarily True;tho I have no further Respects to those Reasons which induced me to believe itTrue, yet if I do but remember, that I haveonce clearlyanddistinctlyperceived it, no Argument can be brought on the contrary, that shall make medoubt, but that I havetrueandcertainKnowledge thereof; and not onely of that, but of all otherTruthsalso which I remember that I haveonce Demonstrated, such as areGeometrical Propositionsand the like.

What now can beObjectedagainst me? shall I say, that I am so made byNature, as to be oftendeceived? No; For I now Know that I cannot bedeceivedin those Things, which IclearlyUnderstand. Shall I say, that at other times I have esteem’d many ThingsTrueandCertain, which afterwards I found to befalsities? No; for I perceived none of those thingsclearlyanddistinctly, but being Ignorant of thisRuleofTruth, I took them up for Reasons, which Reasons I afterward found to beWeak. What then can be said? Shall, I say, (as lately I objected) that Perhaps I amasleep, and that what I now think of is no moreTrue, then theDreamsof Peopleasleep? But this it selfmovesnot my Opinion; for certainly thoI wereasleep, if any thing appear’devidentto my Understanding, ’twould beTrue.

And Thus I Plainly see, that theCertaintyandTruthof allScienceDepends on theKnowledgeof theTrue God, so that before I hadKnown Him, I didKnow nothing; But now many things both ofGodhimself, and of otherIntellectual Things, as also ofCorporeal nature, which is theObjectofMathematicks, may bePlainly KnownandCertainto me.