It now remains that I examine whether anyCorporeal BeingsdoExist; And already I know that (as they are theObjectofPure Mathematicks) theyMay(at least)Exist, for Iclearlyanddistinctlyperceive them; and doubtlessGodisabletomake, whatever I amabletoperceive, and I never Judged any thing to bebeyondhisPower, but what wasRepugnantto adistinct perception. Moreover, suchMaterial Beings seemtoExistfrom thefacultyofImagination, which I find my self make use of, when I am conversant about them: forif I attentively Consider whatImaginationis, ’twill appear to be onlya certain Application of our Cognoscitive or knowing Faculty to a Body or Object that is before it; and if it bebefore it, It mustExist.

But that this may be made morePlain, I must first examine thedifferencebetweenImagination, andpure Intellection, orUnderstanding. So, for example, when IImaginea Triangle, I do not onlyUnderstandthat it is afigure comprehendedbythree Lines, but I alsobeholdwith theeyeof mymindthosethree linesas it werebefore Me, and this is that which I callimagination. But if I convert my Thoughts to aChiliogone, orFigure consistingof aThousand Angles, I know as well that this Is afigure comprehendedby aThousand sides, as I know that aTriangleis aFigure Consistingofthree sides; but I do not in the same MannerImagine, orbeholdaspresentthosethousand sides, as I do thethree sidesof aTriangle. And tho at the time when I so think of aChiliogone, I mayconfusedlyrepresent to my self someFigure(because whenever I Think of aCorporeal Object, I am used toImaginesomeShapeor other)yet ’tis evident that thisRepresentationis not aChiliogone, because ’tis in nothingdifferentfrom what I should Represent to my self if I thought of aMilion-angled figure, or any other Figure ofMore sides; Neither does such aConfused Representationhelp me in the least to know thoseProperties, by which aChiliogonediffers from otherPolygonesorManyangled Figures. But if a Question be put concerning aPentagone, I know I mayUnderstand its Shape, as IUnderstandtheShape, of aChiliogone, without the help ofImagination, but I can alsoimagineit, by applying theEyeof myMindto itsFive sides, and to theAreaorspacecontained by Them; And herein I manifestly perceive that there is required apeculiar sortofOperationin theMindtoimaginea Thing, which I require not toUnderstanda Thing; whichNew Operationof theMindplainly shews thedifferencebetweenimaginationandpure Intellection.

Besides this, I Consider that thisPowerofImaginationwhich is in me (as it differs from thePowerofUnderstanding) does not appertain to theEssenceofMe, that is, ofmy mind, for tho Iwantedit, yetcertainly I should be thesame He, thatnowI am: from whence it seems to follow, that it depends on somethingdifferentfrommy self; and I easily perceive that if anyBodywhatever didExist, to which myMindwere soconjoyn’d, that it may Apply it self when it pleased toConsider, or (as it were)Lookintothis Body; From hence, I say, I perceiveIt may so be, that by this veryBodyI mayImagine Corporeal Beings: So that thisMannerofThinkingdiffers frompure Intellectiononly in this, that theMind, when itUnderstands, does as it were turnit self, toit self, orReflecton it self, andbeholdssome or other of thoseIdeaswhich are in it self; But when itImagines, itConvertsit self uponBody, and thereinbeholdssomething Conformable to thatIdea, which it hathunderstood, orperceivedbySense.

But ’tis to be remembred, that I said, I easily conceive ImaginationMay beso performed, supposingBodytoExist. And because no so convenient manner of Explaining it offers it self, from thence Iprobablyguess, thatBodydoesExist. But this I only sayprobably, for tho I should accurately search into all the Argumentsdrawn from thedistinct IdeaofBody, which I find in myImagination, yet I find none of them, from whence I maynecessarilyconclude,that Body does Exist.

But I have been accustomed toImaginemany other things besides thatCorporeal Naturewhich is theObjectofpure Mathematicks; such as are,Colours,Sounds,Tasts,Pain, &c. but none of these sodistinctly. And because I perceive these better bySense, from Which by the Help of theMemorythey come to theImagination, that I may with the Greater advantage treat of them, I ought at the same time to ConsiderSence, and to try whether from what I perceive by that way ofThought, which I callSense, I can deduce any certain Argument for theExistenceofCorporeal Beings.

And first I will here reflect with my self, what those things were, which being perceived bySenceI have heretofore thoughtTrue, and theReasonswhy Iso thought: I will then enquire into theReasonsfor which I afterwardsdoubtedthose things. And last of all I will consider what Ioughttothinkof those Things atPresent.

First therefore I have always thoughtthat I have had anHead,Hands,Feet, and otherMembers, of whichThis Body(which I have look’d upon as aPartofMe, or Perhaps as myWhole self) Consists; And I have also thought that thisBodyofMineis Conversant or engaged among manyOther Bodies, by which it is Liable to beaffectedwith what isadvantagiousorhurtful; What wasAdvantagiousI judged by a certainsenseofPleasure, what wasHurtfulby asenseofPain. Furthermore, besidesPleasureandPain, I perceived in my selfHunger,Thirst, and other such likeAppetites, as also certainCorporeal PropensionstoMirth,Sadness,Anger, and other likePassions.

As to What hapned to me fromBodies without, Besides theExtension,Figure, andMotionof thoseBodies, I also perceived in themHardness,Heat, and othertactile Qualities, as alsoLight,Colours,Smells,Tasts,Sounds, &c. and by theVariationof these Idistinguish’dtheHeaven,Earth, andSeas, and all otherBodiesfrom each other.

Neither was it wholly without Reason (upon the account of theseIdeasofQualities, which offer’d themselves to my Thoughts, and which alone IproperlyandImmediately perceived) that I thought my self to Perceive some ThingsDifferentfrom myThought, viz.TheBodiesorObjectsfrom whence theseIdeasmightProceed; for I often found theseIdeascome upon me without myConsentorWill; so that I can neither perceive anObject(tho I had a mind to it) unless it werebeforethe Organs of mySense; Neither can IHindermy self from perceiving it, when it isPresent.

And seeing that thoseIdeaswhich I take in by sense are much moreLively,Apparentand in their kind moredistinct, than any of those whichI knowinglyandWillinglyframe by Meditation, or stir up in myMemory; it seems to me that they cannot proceed frommy self. There remains therefore no other way for them to come upon me, but from some other ThingsWithoutMe. Of Which Things seeingIhave no other Knowledge but from theseIdeas,Icannot Think but that theseIdeasarelikethe Things.

Moreover, BecauseIremember thatIfirst made use of mysensesbefore myReason;and becauseIdid perceive that thoseIdeaswhichImy self did frame were not soManifestas those whichIreceived by mysenses, but very oftenmade up of their parts,Iwas easily perswaded to think thatIhad noIdeain myUnderstanding, which I had notFirstin mysense.

Neither was it without Reason thatIJudged,That Body(which by apeculiar right Icall myOwn) to bemore nighlyappertaining toMethen anyother Body. For from It, as from otherBodies,Ican never beseperated,Iwassensibleof allAppetitesandAffections in Itandfor It, and lastlyIperceivedpleasureandPainin its Parts, and not in any other Without it. But why from thesenseof Pain a certainGrief, and from thesenseofpleasurea certainJoyof theMindshould arise, or Why thatGnawingof thestomach, WhichIcallHunger, should put me in mind ofEating, or thedrinessof myThroatofDrinking,Ican give no other Reason butthat I am taught so by Nature. For to my thinking there is noAffinityorLikenessbetween thatGnawingof theStomach, and the desire ofEating, or between thesenseofPain, and thesorrowful thoughtfrom thence arising. But in this as in all otherjudgmentsthat I made ofsensible objects, I seem’d to be taught byNature, for I first perswaded my self that things weresoorso, before ever I enquired into a Reason that may prove it.

But afterwards I discover’d many experiments, wherein mysensesso grosly deceived me, that I would never trust them again; for Towers which seem’dRounda far off, nigh at hand appear’dsquare, andlargeStatues on their tops seem’dsmallto those that stood on the ground; and in numberless other things, I perceived thejudgementsof myoutward sensesweredeceived: and not of myoutwardonly, but of myinward sensesalso; for what is moreintimateorinwardthanPain? And yet I have heard from those, whose Arm or Leg was cut off, that they have feltpainin that part which theywanted, and therefore I am notabsolutely certainthat any part of me is affected withpain, tho Ifeel paintherein. To these I have lately added two verygeneral Reasonsofdoubt;The first was, that while I wasawake, I could not believe my self to perceive any thing, which I could not think my self sometimes to perceive, tho I werea sleep; And seeing I cannot believe, that what I seem to perceive in mysleepproceeds fromoutward Objects, what greater Reason have I to think so of what I perceive whilst I amawake? The other Cause of Doubt was, that seeing I know not theAuthorof myBeing(or at least I thensupposedmy self not to know him) what reason is there but that I may be so ordered byNatureas to bedeceivedeven in those things which appear’d to me mosttrue. And as to theReasons, which induced me to givecredittosensibleThings, ’twas easie to return an answer thereto, for finding by experience, that I was impelled byNatureto many Things, whichReasondisswaded me from, I thought I should not far trust what I was taught byNature. And tho the perceptions of mysensesdepended not on myWill, I thoughtIshould not therefore conclude, that they proceeded fromObjects differentfrom my self; for perhaps there may be some otherFacultyin me (tho as yetunknownto me) which might frame thoseperceptions.

But now that I begin better to knowmy selfand the Author of myOriginal, I do not think, that all things, which I seem to have from mysensesarerashlyto beadmitted, neither are all things sohad, to bedoubted. And first because I know that whatever Iclearlyanddistinctlyperceive,may beso made byGodas I perceive them; thePowerofunderstanding clearlyanddistinctlyone Thingwithoutthe other is sufficient to make Mecertainthat One Thing isdifferentfrom the Other; because itmayat least be placed apart byGod, and that it may be esteem’ddifferent, it matters not by whatPoweritmaybe sosever’d. And therefore from the knowledge I have, thatI my self exist, and because at the same time I understand that nothing else appertains to myNatureorEssence, but that I am athinking Being, I rightly conclude, that myEssenceconsists in this alone, that I am athinking Thing. And thoperhaps(or, as I shall shew presently, ’tiscertain) I have aBodywhich is verynighlyconjoyned to me, yet becauseon this side I have a clear anddistinct Ideaof my self, as I am only athinking Thing, not extended; and on the other side because I have adistinct Ideaof myBody, as it is onely anextendedthing,not thinking, ’tis from hencecertain, that Iam really distinct from my Body, and that I canexist withoutit.

Moreover I find in my self someFacultiesendow’d withcertainpeculiar waies ofthinking, such as theFacultyofImagination, theFacultyofPerceptionorsense; without whichIcan conceive mywhole self clearlyanddistinctly, but (changing the phrase)IcannotconceivethoseFacultieswithoutconceiving My self, that is, anunderstanding substancein which they are; for none of them in theirformal Conceptionincludesunderstanding; from whence I perceive they are asdifferentfromme, as themodusormannerof a Thing isdifferentfrom theThing it self.

I acknowledge also, that I have several otherFaculties, such aschangingofplace,putting on various shapes, &c. Which can no more be understood without asubstancein which they are, then the foremention’dFaculties, and consequentlythey can no more be understood toExistwithout thatsubstance: But yet ’tis Manifest, that this sort ofFaculties, to the End they may exist, ought to be in aCorporeal,Extended, and not in anUnderstanding substance, becauseExtension, and notIntellectionorUnderstandingis included in theClearandDistinct conceptionof them.

But there is also in me a certainPassive Facultyofsense, or ofReceivingandKnowingtheIdeasofsensible Things; of whichFacultyI can make no use, unless there were in my self, or in something else, a certainActive FacultyofProducingandEffectingthoseIdeas. But this cannot be in my self, for it Pre-supposes noUnderstanding, and thoseIdeasare Produced in me, tho I help not, and often against myWill. There remains therefore no Place for thisActive Faculty, but that it should be in somesubstance differentfrom me. In which because all theReallity, which is contain’dObjectivelyin theIdeasProduced by thatFaculty, ought to be contain’dFormallyorEminently(as I have Formerly taken notice) thissubstancemust be eithera Body(in which what is in theIdeas Objectivelyis contain’dFormally) or it Must BeGod, or someCreaturemoreexcellentthen aBody(In which what is in theIdeas Objectivelyis contain’dEminently). But seeing thatGodis not aDeceivour, ’tis altogether Manifest, thathedoes not Place theseIdeasin me eitherImmediatelyfrom himself, orMediatelyfrom any other Creature, wherein theirObjective Reallityis not*contain’dFormally, but onlyEminently. And seeingGodhas given me noFacultyto discern Whether these Ideas proceed fromCorporealorIncorporeal Beings, but rather astrong Inclinationto believe that they are sent fromCorporeal Beings, there is no Reason Why God should not be counted aDeceiver, if theseIdeascame from any Where, but fromCorporeal Things. Therefore we must conclude that there areCorporeal Beings. Which perhaps are not all the same as I comprehend them bymy sense(for Perception by sense is in many Things veryObscureandConfused) but those things at least, which IclearlyanddistinctlyUnderstand, that is to say, all those things which are comprehended under theObjectofPure Mathematicks; those things I say at least areTrue.

As to What Remains, They are either someParticulars, as that the Sun is of such aBignessorShape,&c.or they are Things lessClearlyUnderstood, asLight,Sound,Pain, &c. And tho these and such like Things may be veryDoubtfulandUncertain, yet becauseGodis not aDeceiver, and because that (Therefore) none of my Opinions can befalseunless God has Given me someFacultyor other toCorrectmyError, hence ’tis that I am incouraged with the Hopes of attainingTrutheven in these very Things.

And certainly it cannot be doubted but whateverIam taught byNaturehas something therein ofTruth. ByNaturein General I understand eitherGodhimself, or theCoordinationof Creatures Made by God. By myOwn NatureinParticularI understand theComplexionorAssociationof all those things which are given me by God.

Now there is nothing that thismy Natureteaches me moreexpreslythen that I have aBody, Which is notWellwhen Ifeel Pain, that thisBodywantsMeatorDrinkWhen I amHungryorDry,&c.And therefore I ought not to Doubt but that these things areTrue. And by thissenseofPain,Hunger,Thirst, &c. MyNaturetellsme thatIam not in myBody, as aMarineris in hisShip, but that I am mostnighly conjoyn’dthereto, and as it wereBlended therewith; so thatIwithItmake uponething; For Otherwise, when theBodywere hurt,I, who am only aThinking Thing, should not thereforefeelPain, but should onlyperceivethe Hurt with theEyeof myUnderstanding(as aMariner perceivesby hissightwhatever is broken in his Ship) and when theBodywants either Meat or Drink, I should onlyUnderstandthis want, but should not have theConfused senseofHungerorThirst; I call themConfused, for certainly theSenseofThirst,Hunger,Pain, &c. are onlyConfused ModesorMannersofThoughtarising from theUnionand (as it were)mixtureof theMindandBody.

I am taught also byNature, that there are many otherBodies WithoutandAboutmyBody, some whereof are to bedesired, others are to beAvoided. And because that I Perceive very DifferentColours,Sounds,Smells,Tasts,Heat,Hardness, and the Like, from thence I Rightly conclude that there areCorrespondent DifferencesinBodies, from which thesedifferent perceptionsofsenseproceed, tho perhaps notAlike. And because that some of theseperceptionsarePleasant, othersUnpleasant, ’tis evidentlycertain, that myBody, or rather myWhole self(asIam compounded of aMindandBody) am liable to beAffectedby theseBodieswhich encompass me about.

There are many Other Things Also whichNatureseems to teach Me, butReallyI am not taught by It, but have gotten them by anill useof Passing my JudgementInconsiderately, and from hence it is that these things happen often to befalse; as that allspaceisEmpty, in which I findnothingthatworksupon mySenses; That in ahot Bodythere is somethingliketheIdeaofHeatwhich is in me; That in aWhiteorGreenBody there is the sameWhitenessorGreennesswhich Iperceive; And the sameTastein abitterorsweetThing,&c.ThatStars,Castles, and OtherRemoteBodies are of the sameBignessandShape, as they areRepresentedto mysenses: and such like. But that I may not admit of any Thing in this very matter, which I cannotDistinctlyperceive, it behoves me here to determine moreAccuratelyWhat I mean when I say,That I am taught a Thing by Nature.

Here I takeNaturemorestrictly, then for theComplicationof all those Things which are Given me byGod; For in thisComplicationthere are many things contain’d which relate to theMind alone, as, That I perceive What isdonecannot benot Done, and all Other things which are known by theLightofNature, but of these I speak not at present. There are also many Other Things which belongonlyto theBody, as, That ittends Downwardsand such like, of these also I treat not at Present. But I speak of those Things only whichGodhath bestowed upon me as I amCompoundedof aMindandBody together, and notdifferently Consider’d. ’TisNaturetherefore thus taken that teaches me toavoid troublesome Objects, andseekafterpleasing Ones; but it appears not that thisNatureteaches us to conclude any thing of these Perceptions of oursenses, before that we make by ourUnderstandinga diligent examination ofoutward Objects; for to Enquire into theTruthof Things belongs not to theWhole Compositumof a Man as he Consists ofMindandBody, but to theMind alone.

So that tho astar affectmy eye nomorethen asmall sparkof Fire, yet there is in my Eye noRealorPositive InclinationtobelieveOne no bigger then the Other, but thus I have been used to Judge from my Childhood without any Reason: and tho coming nigh the Fire I feel Heat, and Coming too nigh I feel Pain, yet there is no Reason to perswade me, That in the Fire there is any thinglikeeither that Heat or that Pain, but only that there is something therein, Whatever it be, that excites in us thosesensationsof Heat or Pain: and so tho in some space there may be nothing that Works on mysenses, it does not from thence follow, that there is noBodythere; for I see that in these and many other things I am used to overturn the Order of Nature, because I use theseperceptionsofsense(which properly are given me by Nature to make known to the mind what isadvantagiousorhurtfulto theCompositum, whereof themindis part, andso faronly they areClearandDistinctenough) ascertain Rulesimmediately to discover theEssenceofExternal Bodies, of Which they make known nothing but veryObscurelyandConfusedly.

I have * formerly shewn how myJudgementhappens to be false notwithstandingGods Goodness. But now there arises a newDifficultyconcerning those very things whichNaturetells me I am toprosecuteoravoid, concerning myInternal senses, Wherein I find manyErrors, as when a Man being deceived by the Pleasant Taste of some sort of Meat, devours therein some hidden Poyson. But in this very Instance it cannot be said, that the Man is impelled by Nature to desire thePoyson, for of that he is wholly Ignorant; but he is said to Desire theMeatonly as being of a grateful Taste; and from hence nothing can be concluded but, ThatMans-Natureis notAll-knowing; which is no Wonder seeing Man is aFinite Being, and therefore nothing butFinite Perfectionsbelong to him.

But We often err even in those things to Which we areImpelledbyNature, as when sick men desire thatMeatorDrink, which will certainly prove Hurtful to them. To this it may perhaps be reply’d, That theyErrin this because theirNatureisCorrupt. But this Answers not the Difficulty,For a sick man is no lessGods Creaturethen a Man in Health, and therefore ’tis as Absurd to Imagine aDeceitful Natureimposed byGodon the One as on the Other; And as a Clock that is made up of Wheels and Weights does no less strictly observe theLawsof itsNature, when it isillcontrived, and tells the hoursfalsly, as when it answers the Desire of the Artificer in all performances; so if I consider the body of a Man as a meerMachineorMovement, made up and compounded ofBones,Nerves,Muscles,Veins,Blood, andSkin; so that, tho there were nomindin It, yet It would perform all those Motions which now are in it (those only excepted which Proceed from theWill, and consequently from theMind) I do easily acknowledge, that it would be asnaturalfor him (if for example sake he were sick of aDropsie) to suffer thatDrinessof hisThroatwhich uses to bring into his mind thesenseofThirst, & that thereby his Nerves and other Parts would be so disposed as to take Drink, by Which his disease would be encreased; As (supposing him to be troubled with no such Distemper) by the like Driness of Throat he would be disposedto Drink, when ’tis Requisite. And tho, if I respect the Intended use of a Clock I may say that itErrsfrom itsNature, when it tells the Hourswrong, and so considering theMovementof aMans Bodyas contrived for suchMotionsas are used to be performed thereby, I may think That also toErrfrom itsNature, if itsThroatisDry, when it has no want of Drink for itsPreservation. Yet I Plainly discover, that this lastAcceptationofNaturediffers much from that whereof we have been speaking all this While, for this is only aDenomination extrinsickto the Things whereof ’tis spoken, anddependingon myThought, while itComparesasickman, and adisorderlyClock with theIdeaof anhealthyman and aRectifiedClock. But byNaturein its formerAcceptationI Understand something that isReallyin theThingsthemselves, which therefore has something ofTruthin it.

But tho Respecting only aBody sickof a Dropsie it be anExtrinsick Denominationto say, that itsNatureisCorrupt, because it has aDry Throat, and stands inno needof Drink; yet respecting theWhole CompoundorMind joyn’dto such aBody, ’tisnot ameer Denomination, but areal ErrorofNaturefor it tothirstwhendrinkishurtfulto it. It remains therefore here to be inquired, how theGoodnessofGodsuffersNature so takento bedeceivable.

First therefore I understand that achief differencebetween myMindandBodyconsists in this, That myBodyis of itsNature divisible, but myMind indivisible; for while I consider myMindormy self, as I am only athinking Thing, I can distinguishno partsin Me, but I perceive my self to be butone entireThing; and tho thewhole Mindseems to beunitedto thewhole Body, yet a Foot, an Arm, or any other part of the Body being cut off, I do not therefore conceive anypartof myMindtaken away; Neither can itsFacultiesofdesiring,perceiving,understanding, &c. be called itsParts, for ’tis one and thesame,mind, thatdesires, thatperceives, thatunderstands; Contrarily, I cannot think of anyCorporealorextended Being, which I cannot easilydivideintoPartsby my thought, and by this I understand it to bedivisible. And this alone (if I had known it from no other Argument) is sufficient to informme, that mymindisreally distinctfrom myBody.

Nextly I find, that mymindis notimmediately affectedby all parts of mybody, but only by theBrain, and perhaps only by one small part of it, That, to wit, wherein thecommon senseis said to reside; Which part, as often as it is disposed in thesame manner, will represent to themindthesame thing, tho at the same time the other parts of thebodymay bedifferentlyorder’d. And this is proved by numberless Experiments, which need not here be related.

Moreover I discover that thenatureof mybodyis such, that no part of it can bemovedby an otherremotepart thereof, but it may also bemovedin thesame mannerby some of theinterjacentparts, tho the moreremotepart lay still and acted not; As for example in the Rope,

A⸺B⸺C⸺D

if its end D. were drawn, the end A. would be moved no otherwise, than if one of the intermediate parts B. or C. were drawn, and the end D. rest quiet. So when I feelpainin myFoot, the consideration of Physicks instructs me, thatthis is performed by the help ofNervesdispersed through the Foot, which from thence beingcontinuedlike Ropes to the very Brain, whilst they aredrawnin the Foot, they alsodrawthe inward parts of the Brain to which they reach, and therein excite a certainmotion, which is ordain’d byNatureto affect themindwith asenseofPain, as being in theFoot. But because these Nerves must pass through theShin, theThighs, theLoins, theBack, theNeck, before they can reach theBrainfrom theFoot, it may so happen, that thothat partof them, which is in the Foot were not touch’d, but only some of theirintermediate parts, yet the samemotion, would be caused in theBrain, as when theFootit self isill affected, from whence ’twill necessarily follow, that themindshouldperceivethe samePain. And thus may we think of any otherSense.

I understand lastly, that seeing each single motion perform’d in that part of theBrain, whichimmediately affectsthemind, excites therein only one sort ofsense, nothing could be contrived more conveniently in this case, than that, of all thoseSenseswhich it can cause, itshould cause that whichcheifly, and mostfrequentlyconduces to theconservationof anhealthful Man; And experience witnesses, that to this veryendall oursensesare given us byNature; and therefore nothing can be found therein, which does not abundantly testifie thePowerandGoodnessofGod. Thus for Example, when the Nerves of the Feet are violently and more than ordinarily moved, that motion of them being propagated through theMedulla Spinalisof the Back to the inward parts of the Brain, there it signifies to the mind, that something or other is to be felt, and what is this but Pain, as if it were in the Foot, by which the Mind is excited to use its indeavours for removing the Cause, as being hurtful to the Foot. But theNatureofManmight have been soorder’dbyGod, that That same motion in the Brain should represent to the mind any other thing,viz.either it self as ’tis in the Brain, or it self as it is in the Foot, or in any of the other forementioned intermediate parts, or lastly any other thing whatsoever; but none of these would have so much conduced to theConservationof theBody.In the like manner when we want drink, from thence arises a certaindrynessin theThroat, which moves the Nerves thereof, and by their means the inward parts of the Brain, and this motionaffectsthemindwith thesenseofthirst; because that in this case nothing is more requisite for us to know, then that wewant drinkfor thePreservationof ourHealth. So of the Rest.

From all which ’tis manifest, that (notwithstanding theinfinite Goodnessof God) ’tis impossible but theNatureofManas he consists of amindandbodyshould bedeceivable. For if any cause should excite (not in the Foot but) in the Brain it self, or in any other part through which the Nerves are continued from the Foot to the Brain, thatself samemotion, which uses to arise from the Foot being troubled, thePainwould be feltas in the Foot, and thesensewould benaturallydeceived; for ’tis consonant to Reason (seeing that That same motion of the Brain alwayes represents to the mind that same sense, and it oftner proceeds from a causehurtfulto theFoot, than from any other) I say ’tis reasonable, that it should makeknown to themindthe Pain of theFoot, rather than of any otherpart. And so if adrynessofThroatarises (not as ’tis used from thenecessityofdrinkfor theconservationof theBody, but) from anunusual Cause, as it happens in aDropsie, ’tis far better that it shouldthen deceive us; then that it shouldalwayes deceiveus when theBodyis inHealth, and so of the Rest.

And this consideration helps me very much, not only tounderstandtheErrorsto which myNatureis subject, but also tocorrectandavoidthem. For seeing I know that all mySensesdo oftener inform mefalslythantruelyin those things which conduce to theBodies advantage; and seeing I can use (almost alwayes) more of them than one toExaminethe same thing, as also I can usememory, which joyns present and past things together, and myunderstandingalso, which hath already discovered to me all thecausesof myErrors, I ought no longer to fear, that what mySensesdaily represent to me should be false. But especially thoseextravagant Doubtsof my First Meditation are to be turn’d off as ridiculous; andperticularly thechiefof them,viz. That*of notdistinguishing SleepfromWaking, for now I plainly discover a greatdifference, between them, for myDreamsare neverconjoynedby mymemorywith the otheractionsofmy life, as whatever happens to meawakeis; and certainly if (while I were awake) any person should suddenly appear to me, and presently disappear (as inDreams) so that I could not tellfrom whencehe came orwherehe went, I should rather esteem it aSpectreorApparition feign’din my Brain, then atrue Man; but when such things occur, as I distinctly know fromwhence,where, andwhenthey come, and Iconjoyntheperceptionof them by mymemorywith the otherAccidentsof mylife, I amcertainthey are represented to mewakingand notasleep, neither ought I in the least to doubt of theirTruth, if after I have called up all mysenses,memory, andunderstandingto theirExaminationI find nothing in any of them, that clashes with other truths; ForGodnot being aDeceiver, it follows, that In such things I am notdeceived. But because theurgencyofActionin the commonoccurrencesofAffairswill not alwayes allow time for such anaccurate examination, I must confess thatMans lifeissubjectto manyErrorsaboutperticulars, so that theinfirmityof ourNaturemust beacknowledgedby Us.

FINIS.