Of late it has been so common with me to withdrawmy Mindfrom mysences, and I have so throughly consider’d how few things there are appertaining toBodiesthat aretrulyperceived, and that there are more Things touchingMans mind, and yet more concerningGod, which arewell known; that now without any difficultyIcan turn myThoughts from thingssensible, to those which are onlyIntelligible, andAbstractedfromMatter. And truelyIhave a much moredistinct Ideaof aMans mind(as it is aThinking Thing, having noCorporeal DimensionsofLength,Breadth, andThickness, nor having any otherCorporeal Quality) then theIdeaof anyCorporeal Thingcan be. And when I reflect upon my self, and consider how that Idoubt, that is, am animperfect dependent Being, I from hence Collect such aclearanddistinct Ideaof anIndependent perfect Being, which isGod, and from hence only thatI have such an Idea, that is, becauseIthat have thisIdeadomy self Exist; I do soclearlyconclude thatGod also Exists, and that on him myBeing dependseach Minute; That I am Confident nothing can be known moreEvidentlyandCertainlybyHumane Understanding.
And nowIseem to perceive aMethodby which, (from this Contemplation of thetrue God, in whom the Treasures ofKnowledgeandWisdomeare Hidden)Imay attain theKnowledgeof other Things.
And first,Iknow ’tis impossible that thisGodshoulddeceiveme; For in allcheatinganddeceiptthere is something ofimperfection; and tho to beabletodeceivemay seem to be an Argument ofingenuityandpower, yet without doubt tohavetheWillofdeceivingis a sign ofMaliceandWeakness, and therefore is notIncidenttoGod.
I have also found in my self aJudicative faculty, which certainly (as all other things I possess) I have received fromGod; and seeing he will notdeceiveme, he has surely given me such aJudgement, that I cannever Err, whilst I make aRight Useof it. Of which truth I can make no doubt, unless it seems, that From hence it will follow, That thereforeI can never Err; for if whatever I have, I have fromGod, and if he gave me noFacultyofErring, I may seem not to beable to Err. And truly so it is whilst I think uponGod, and wholly convert my self to theconsiderationof him, I find no occasion ofErrororDeceit; but yet when I return to theContemplationofmy self, I find my self liable toInnumerable Errors. Enquiring into thecauseof which, I find in my self anIdea, not only arealandpositive oneof aGod, that is, of aBeing infinitely perfect,but also (as I may so speak) aNegative IdeaofNothing; that is to say, I am so constituted between God and Nothing or between a perfectBeingandNo-being, that as I amCreatedby theHighest Being, I have nothing in Me by which I may bedeceivedor drawn intoError; but as I pertake in a manner ofNothing, or of aNo-Being, that is, as I my self amnottheHighest Being, and as Iwantmanyperfections, ’tis no Wonder that I should beDeceived.
By which I understand thatError*(as it isError) is not anyreal Beingdependant onGod, but it is only aDefect; And that therefore to make meErrthere is not requisite afacultyofErringgiven me byGod, but only it so happens that IErrmeerly because theJudicative faculty, which he has given me, is notInfinite.
But yet this Account is not fullysatisfactory; forErroris not only a meerNegation, but ’tis aPrivation, or awantof a certainKnowledge, whichought(as it were) to be in me. And when I consider theNatureofGod, it seems impossible that he should give me anyfacultywhich is notperfectin itskind, or which shouldwantany of itsdue perfections; for if byhow much the moreskilfultheWorkmanis, by so much thePerfecter Worksproceed from him. What can be made by theGreat Makerof all things which is notfully perfect? For I cannot Doubt butGodmayCreateme so that I mayneverbedeceived, neither can I doubt but that heWillswhatever isBest; Is it thereforebetterfor me to bedeceived, or not to bedeceived?
These things when I Consider more heedfully, it comes into my Mind, First, that ’tis no cause of Admiration thatGodshould do Things whereof I can give no account, nor must I therefore doubt hisBeing, because there are many things done by him, and I not comprehendWhyorHowthey are done; for seeing I now know that myNatureis veryWeakandFinite, and that theNatureofGodisImmense,Incomprehensible,Infinite; from hence I must fully, understand, that he can do numberless things, theCauseswhereof liehiddento Me. Upon which account only I esteem all those Causes which are Drawn from the End (viz.Final Causes) as of no use inNatural Philosophy, for I cannot without Rashness Think myselfableto DiscoverGodsDesignes.
I perceive this also, that whenever we endeavour to know whether theWorksofGodareperfect, we must not Respect anyone kindof Creaturesingly, but theWhole UniverseofBeings; for perhaps what (if consideredalone) may Deservedly seemImperfect, yet (as it is apartof theWorld) is mostperfect; and tho since I havedoubtedof all things, I have discover’d nothingcertainlytoExist, butmy self, andGod, yet since I have Consider’d theOmnipotencyofGod, I cannot deny, but that many other thingsare made(or at least,may be made) by him, so that I my selfmay beapartof thisUniverse.
Furthermore, coming nigher to my self, and enquiring what theseErrorsof mine, are (which are the Only Arguments of myImperfection) * I find them todependontwo concurring Causes, on myfacultyofKnowing, and on myfacultyofChoosingorFreedomeof myWill, that is to say, from myUnderstanding, and myWill together. For by myUnderstanding aloneI only perceiveIdeas, whereon I makeJudgments, wherein (preciselyso taken) there can be noError, properlyso called; for tho perhaps there may be numberless things, whoseIdeasI havenotin Me, yet I am notproperlyto be saidDeprivedof them, but onlynegatively wantingthem; and I cannot prove thatGod oughtto have given me agreater facultyofKnowing. And tho I understand him to be askilful Workman, yet I cannot Think, that heoughtto have put all thoseperfectionsineachWork of hissingly, with which he might haveendowed someof them.
Neither can I complain thatGodhas not given me aWill, orFreedomofChoise,largeandperfectenough; for I have experienced that ’tisCircumscribedbyno Bounds.
And ’tis worth our taking notice, that I have no other thing in me soperfectand soGreat, but I Understand that there may bePerfecterandGreater, for if (for Example) I consider theFacultyofUnderstanding, I presently perceive that in me ’tis verysmallandFinite, and also at the same time I form to my self anIdeaof an otherUnderstandingnot onlymuch Greater, but theGreatestandInfinite, which I perceive to belong toGod. In the same manner if I enquire intomemoryorimaginationor anyother faculties, I find them in my selfWeakandCircumscribed, but inGodI Understand them to beInfinite, there is therefore only myWillorFreedomeofChoice, which I find to beso Great, that I cannot frame to my self anIdeaofOne Greater, so that ’tis by thischieflyby which I Understand my self to Bear thelikenessandImageofGod. For tho theWillinGodbe without comparisonGreaterthen Mine, both as to theKnowledgeandPowerwhich areJoyn’dtherewith, which make it morestrongandEffective, and also as to theObjectthereof, forGodcan apply himself tomorethings then I can. Yet being takenFormallyandPrecisely Gods Willseemsno greaterthen Mine. For theFreedomeofWillconsists only in this, that we canDo, ornot Dosuch a Thing (that is,affirmordeny,prosecuteoravoid) or rather in this Only, that we areso carriedto a Thing which isproposedby OurIntellecttoAffirmorDeny,ProsecuteorShun, that we aresensible, that we arenot Determin’dto theChoiceorAversionthereof, by anyoutward Force.
Neither is it Requisite to make oneFreethat he should have anInclinationtobothsides. For on the contrary, by how muchthe morestronglyI am inclined tooneside (whether it be that Ievidently perceivetherein Good or Evil, or Whether it be thatGod has so disposedmyInward Thoughts) By so much themore Freeam I in myChoice.
Neither truly doGods GraceorNatural Knowledgetake away from myLiberty, but ratherencreaseandstrengthenit. For thatindifferencewhich I find in my self, when no Reason inclines memoretoone side, then tothe other, is themeanestsort ofLiberty, and is so far from being a sign ofperfection, that it only argues adefectornegationofKnowledge; for if I should alwaysClearly seewhat wereTrueandGoodI should neverdeliberatein myJudgementorChoice, and Consequently, tho I wereperfectly Free, yet I should never beIndifferent.
From all which, I perceive that neither thePowerofWilling preciselyso taken, which I have fromGod, is theCauseof myErrors, it being mostfullandperfectin its kind; Neither also thePowerofUnderstanding, for whatever IUnderstand(since ’tis from God that IUnderstandit) Iunderstand aright, nor can I be thereinDeceived.
FromWhencetherefore proceed all myErrors? To which, I answer, that they proceed fromhenceonly, that seeing theWillexpatiates it selffartherthen theUnderstanding, I keep it not within thesame boundswith myUnderstanding, but often extend it to those things which IUnderstand not, to which things it beingIndifferent, it easily Declines from what isTrueandGood; and consequently I amDeceivedandCommit sin.*Thus, for example, when lately I felt my self to enquire, Whether any thing dothExist, and found that from my settingmy selfto Examine such a thing, it evidently follows that Imy self Exist, I could not butJudge, what I soclearly Understood, to betrue, not that I wasforcedthereto by anyoutward impulse, but because astrong Propensionin myWilldid follow thisGreat Lightin myUnderstanding, so that I believed it so much the morefreelyandwillingly, by how much the lessindifferentI was thereto. But now I understand, not only, that IExistas I am aThingthatThinks, but I also meet with a certainIdeaof aCorporeal Nature, and it so happens that Idoubt, whether thatThinking Naturethat is in me beDifferentfrom thatCorporeal Nature, or Whether they areboth the same: but in thisIsuppose thatIhave found no Argument toinclinemeeither ways, and thereforeIamIndifferenttoaffirmordeny either, or toJudge nothingofeither; But thisindifferencyextends it self not only to those things of which I amclearly ignorant, but generally to all those things which arenotso veryevidently knownto me at the Time when myWill Deliberatesof them; for tho never so probableGuesses inclineme tooneside, yet the Knowing that they are onlyConjectures, and not indubitablereasons, is enough to Draw myAssentto theContraryPart. Which LatelyIhave sufficiently experienced, whenIsupposed all those things (which formerlyIassented to as mostTrue) as veryFalse, for thisReasononly thatIfound my selfableto doubt of them in some manner.
If I abstain frompassingmyJudgment, when I donot clearlyanddistinctlyenough perceive what isTruth, ’tis evident that I dowell, and that I amnot deceived: But if Iaffirmordeny, then ’tis that Iabusethefreedomeof mywill, and if I turn my self to that part which isfalse, I amdeceived;but if IembracethecontraryPart, ’tis butby chancethat I light on theTruth, yet I shall not therefore be Blameless, for ’tis Manifest by thelightofNaturethat thePerceptionof theUnderstanding oughtto preceed theDeterminationof theWill. And ’tis in thisabuseofFree-Willthat ThatPrivationconsists, which ConstitutesError; I say there is aPrivationin theActionas it proceeds from Me, but not in theFacultywhich I have received fromGod; nor in theActionas itdependsonhim.
Neither have I any Reason to Complain that God has not given me alarger Intellective Faculty, or moreNatural Light, for ’tis a necessary Incident to afinite Understandingthat it should not UnderstandAllthings, and ’tis Incident to aCreated Understandingto beFinite: and I have more Reason to thank him for what he hasbestowedupon me (tho heowedme nothing) then to think my selfRobbedby him of those things which henever gave me.
Nor have I Reason to Complain that he has given me aWilllarger then myUnderstanding: for seeing theWillConsists inonething only, and as it were in anIndivisible(viz. toWill, ornot to Will) it seemscontrary to its nature that it should belessthen ’tis; and certainly by how much theGreaterit is, so much the moreThankfulI ought to be tohim; that Gave it me.
Neither can I Complain that Godconcurrswith me in the Production of thoseVoluntary ActionsorJudgementsin which I amdeceived: for thoseActsas theydependonGodare altogetherTrueandGood; and I am in some measuremore perfectin that I canso Act, then if I couldnot: for thatPrivation, in which theRatio FormalisofFalshoodandSinconsists, wants not theConcourseofGod; For it isnot A Thing, and having respect to him as itsCause, ought not to be calledPrivation, butNegation; for certainly ’tis noImperfectioninGod, that he has given me afreedomeofAssentingornot Assentingto some things, theclearanddistinctKnowledge whereof he has notImpartedto myUnderstanding; but certainly ’tis anImperfectionin me, that Iabusethisliberty, andpassmyJudgementon those things which I donot RightlyUnderstand.
Yet I see that ’tis Possible withGodto effect that (tho I should remainFree, andof aFinite Knowledge) I shouldnever Err, that is, if he had endowed myUnderstandingwith aclearanddistinctKnowledge of all things whereof I should ever have anOccasionofdeliberating; or if he had only so firmly fix’d in my Mind, that I should never forget, this,That I must never Judge of a thing which I do not clearly and distinctly Understand; Either of which things hadGoddone, I easily perceive thatI(as consider’d in my self) should bemore perfectthen now I am, yet nevertheless I cannot deny but that theremay be a greater perfectionin thewhole Universeof Things, for that some of its parts are Obnoxious toErrors, and some not, then if they were allalike. And I have no Reason to Complain, that it has pleased God, that I shouldActon theStageof thisWorldaPartnot thechiefandmost perfectof all; Or that I should not be able to abstain fromErrorin thefirst wayabove specifi’d, which depends upon theEvident Knowledgeof those things whereofI deliberate; Yet that I may abstain fromErrorby theother meansabovemention’d, which depends only on this,That I Judge not of any Thing, the truth whereof is not Evident.For tho I have experienced in my self thisInfirmity, that I cannotalwaysbe intent upononeand thesameKnowledge, yetImay by acontinuedandoften repeatedMeditation bring this to pass, that as often asIhave use of this RuleImay Remember it, by which means I may Get (as it were) anhabitofnot erring.
In which thing seeing, thegreatestandchief perfectionofManconsists,Irepute my self to have gain’d much by this daysMeditation, for that thereinIhave discover’d theCauseofError,and Falshood; which certainly can be no other then whatIhave now Declared; for whenever in Passing my Judgement,Ibridle myWillso that it extend it selfonlyto those things which Iclearlyanddistinctlyperceive, it is impossible that I canErr. For doubtless AllclearanddistinctPerception issomething, and therefore cannotproceedfromNothing, but must necessarily haveGodfor itsAuthor(God, I say, Who isinfinitely Perfect, and whocannot Deceive) and therefore it Must beTrue.
Nor have I this Day learnt only what I mustbeware offthat I be notdeceived, but also what I mustDoto DiscoverTruth,forThatI shall certainly find, if I fully Apply my self to those thingsonly, which Iperfectlyunderstand; and if I distinguish between those and what I apprehend butconfusedlyandobscurely; Both which hereafter I shall endeavour.
