Now will I shut my eyes, I will stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses, I will blot out the Images ofcorporealthings clearly from my mind, or (because that can scarce be accomplish’d) I will give no heed to them, as beingvainandfalse, and by discoursing with my self, and prying more rightly into my own Nature, will endeavour to make my self by degrees more known and familiar to my self.

I am aThinking Thing, that is to say,doubting,affirming,denying,understandingfew things,ignorantof many things,willing,nilling,imaginingalso, andsensitive. For (as before I have noted) though perhaps whatever Iimagine, or am sensible of, as without me,Is not; yet thatmannerofthinkingwhich I callsenseandimagination(as they are only certainModesofThinking) I am certain are in Me. So that in these few Words I have mention’d whatever Iknow, or at least Whatever as yet Iperceivemy self toknow.

Now will I look about me more carefully to see Whether there Be not some other Thing in Me, of Which I have not yet taken Notice. I am sure That I am aThinking Thing, and therefore Do not I know what is Required to makecertainof any Thing? I Answer, that in this Myfirst knowledge’tis Nothing but aclear, anddistinct perceptionof What I affirm, Which would not be sufficient to make mecertainof theTruthof a Thing, if it werePossiblethat any thing that I soclearlyanddistinctlyPerceive should befalse. Wherefore I may lay this Down as aPrinciple.Whatever I Clearly and Distinctly perceive is certainly True.

But I have formerly Admitted of many Things as veryCertainandmanifest, Which I afterwards found to bedoubtful. Therefore What sort of Things were they?Viz.Heaven, Earth, Stars, and all other things which I perceived by mySenses. But What did I Perceive of TheseClearly? Viz.That I had theIdeasorThoughtsof these things in my mind, and at Present I cannot deny that I have theseIdeasin Me. But there was some other thing Which I affirm’d, and Which (by Reason of the common Way of Belief) I thought that IClearlyPerceived; Which nevertheless, I did not really Perceive; And that was, that there were Certain ThingsWithout Mefrom whence theseIdeas Proceeded, and to which they were exactly like. And this it was, Wherein I was eitherDeceived, or if by Chance I Judgedtruly, yet it Proceeded not from the strength of myPerception.

But When I was exercised about any single and easie Proposition in Arithmetick or Geometry, as that two and three added make five, Did not I Perceive themClearlyenough to make me affirm them True? Truly concerning these I had no other Reason afterwards toDoubt, but That I thought Perhaps there may be aGodwho might have so created me, that I should beDeceivedeven in those things which seem’d mostClearto me. And as often as this Pre-conceived opinion ofGods great Powercomes into my Mind, I cannot but Confess that he may easily cause me to Err even in those things which I Think I perceive mostEvidentlywith my Mind; yet as often as I Consider the Things themselves, which I Judge my self to perceive soClearly, I am so fully Perswaded by them, that I easily Break out into these Expressions, Let Who can Deceive Me, yet he shall never Cause meNot to BewhilstI think that I Am, or that it shall ever be True,that I never was, Whilst at Present ’tis Truethat I am, or Perhaps, that Two and Three added make More or Less then Five; for in These things I Percieve a Manifest Repugnancy; And truely seeing I have no reason to Think anyGodaDeceiver, Nor as yet fully know Whether there Beany God, orNot, ’Tis but a slight and (as I may say) Metaphysical Reason of Doubt, which depends only on that opinion of which I am not yet Perswaded.

Wherefore That this Hindrance may be taken away, When I have time I ought to Enquire, Whether thereBe a God, And if there be One, Whether he can be aDeceiver, For whilst I amIgnorantof this, Icannot possibly be fullyCertainof any Other thing.

But now Method seems to Require Me to Rank all My Thoughts under certain Heads, and to search in Which of themTruthorFalshoodproperly Consists. Some of them are (as it were) theImagesof Things, and to these alone the Name of anIdeaproperly belongs, as When I think upon a Man, A Chimera or Monster, Heaven, an Angel, orGod. But there are others of them, that havesuperadded Formsto them, as when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny. I know I have alwayes (when ever I think) some certain Thing as thesubjectorobjectof my Thought, but in this last sort of thoughts there is somethingmorewhich I Think upon then Barely the likeness of the Thing. And of these Thoughts some are calledWillsandAffections, and Others of themJudgments.

Now as touchingIdeas, if they be Consider’d alone as they are in themselves, withoutRespectto any other Things, they cannot Properly befalse; for Whether IImaginea Goat or a Chimera, ’tis asCertainthat IImagineone as t’other. Also intheWillandAffectionsI need not Fear anyFalshood, For tho I shouldWishforevil Things, or Things that are Not, it is not thereforeNot truethat I Wish for them.

Wherefore there onely Remains myJudgmentsof Things, in which I must take Care that I be notdeceived. Now the Chief and most usualErrorthat I discover in them is, That IJudgeThoseIdeasthat arewithinme to beConformableand like to certain things that arewithoutMe; for truely if I Consider those Ideas as certainModesof myThought, without Respect to any other Thing, they will scarce afford me an Occasion ofErring.

Of theseIdeassome areInnate, someAdventitious, and some Others seem to Me as Created by my self; For that I understand whatA ThingIs, What isTruth, What aThought, seems to Proceed meerly from my ownNature. But that I nowheara Noise,seethe Sun, orfeelheat,Ihave alwayesJudgedto Proceed from ThingsExternal. But Lastly, Mermaids, Griffins, and such like Monsters, aremade meerlybyMy self. And yetImay well think all of them eitherAdventitious,or all of themInnate, or all of themmade by my self, for I have not as yet discover’d their trueOriginal.

ButIought cheifly to search after those of them whichIcountAdventitious, and which I consider as coming fromoutward objects, that I may know what reason I have to think themlikethe things themselves, which theyrepresent. Viz.Nature so teaches Me; and also I know that theydependnot on myWill, and thereforenot on me; for they are often present with me against my inclinations, or (as they say) in spite of my teeth, as now whetherI willornoI feel heat, and therefore I think that thesenseorIdeaof heat is propagated to me by athingreallydistinctfrommy self, and that is by theheatof theFireat which I sit; And nothing is more obvious then for me to judge that That thing should transmit its ownLikenessinto me, rather then that any other thing should be transmitted by it. Which sort of arguments whether firme enough or not I shall now Trie.

When I here say, thatnature so teaches me, I understand only, that I am as it werewillingly forcedto beleive it, andnot that ’tisdiscover’dto me to betrueby anynatural light; for these two differ very much. For whatever is discover’d to me by theLightofnature(as that it necessarily Followsthat I am, becauseI think) cannot possibly bedoubted; Because I am endowed with no otherFaculty, in which I may put so great confidence, as I can in theLightofnature; orwhichcan possibly tell me, that those things arefalse, whichnatural lightteaches me to betrue; and as to mynatural Inclinations, I have heretofore often judged my self led by them to the election of theworst part, when I was in the choosingoneof two Goods; and therefore I see no reason why I should evertrustthem in any other thing.

And then, tho theseIdeas depend noton mywill, it does not therefore follow that theynecessarily proceedfromthings external. For as, Altho thoseInclinations(which I but now mention’d) are in me, yet they seemdistinctanddifferentfrom mywill; so perhaps there may be in me some otherfaculty(to meunknown) which may prove theEfficient causeof theseIdeas, as hitherto I have observedthem to be formed in me whilst Idream, without the help of anyExternal Object.

And last of all, tho they shouldproceedfrom things which aredifferentfrom me, it does not therefore follow that they must belikethose things. For often times I have found thethingand theIdea differingmuch. As for example, I find in my self two diversIdeasof the Sun,oneasreceivedby mysenses(and which cheifly I reckon among those I call adventitious) by which it appears to me verysmal,*anotheras taken from the arguments of Astronomers (that is to say,consequentially collected, or some other ways made by me from certainnatural notions) by which ’tis rendred something bigger then the Globe of the Earth. Certainly both of these cannot belikethat sun which iswithout me, and my reason perswades me, that thatIdeais mostunlikethe Sun, which seems toproceed Immediatelyfrom it self.

All which things sufficiently prove, that I have hitherto (not from atrue judgement, but from ablind impulse) beleived that there are certain thingsdifferentfrom myself, and which have sent theirIdeasorImagesinto me by the Organs of mysenses, or some other way.

But I have yet an other Way of inquiring, whether any of those Things (whoseIdeasI havewithinMe) are Really ExistentwithoutMe; And that is Thus: As thoseIdeasare onlyModesofThinking, I acknowledge noInequalitybetween them, and they all proceed from me in thesame Manner. But asoneRepresentsone thing, another, another Thing, ’tis Evident there is aGreat differencebetween them.*For without doubt, Those of them which RepresentSubstancesare somethingMore, or (as I may say) haveMoreofObjective Reallityin them, then those that Represent onlyModesorAccidents; and again,Thatby Which I understand aMighty God,Eternal,Infinite,Omniscient,Omnipotent Creatourof all things besides himself, has certainly in itmore Objective Reallity, then ThoseIdeasby whichFinite Substancesare Exhibited.

But Now, it is evident by theLightofNaturethat there must beas muchat least in theTotal efficient Cause, as there is in theEffectofthat Cause; For from Whencecan theeffecthave itsReallity, but from theCause? and how can theCausegive it thatReallity, unlessit self haveit?

And from hence it follows, that neither aThingcan be made out ofNothing, Neither a Thing which ismore Perfect(that is, Which has in it selfmore Reallity)proceedfrom That Which isLess Perfect.

And this isClearlyTrue, not only in thoseEffectswhoseActualorFormal Reallityis Consider’d, But in ThoseIdeasalso, WhoseObjective Reallityis only Respected; That is to say, for Example of Illustration, it is not only impossible that a stone, Whichwas not, should now beginto Be, unless it were produced bysomething, in Which, Whatever goes to the Making a Stone, is eitherFormallyorVirtually; neither canheatbe Produced in any Thing, which before wasnot hot, but by a Thing which is at least of as equal adegreeofPerfectionasheatis; But also ’tis Impossible that I should have anIdeaof Heat, or of aStone, unless it were put into me by someCause, in which there is at Least as muchReallity, as I Conceive there is in heat or a Stone. For tho thatCausetransfersnone of its ownActualorFormal Realityinto myIdea, I must not from thence conclude that ’tisless real; but I may think that thenatureof theIdeait self is such, that of it self it requires no otherformal reality, but what it has from mythought, of which ’tis amode. But that this Idea hasthisorthat objective reallity, rather then anyother, proceeds clearly from somecause, in which there ought to be at least as muchformal reallity, as there is ofobjective reallityin theIdeait self. For if we suppose any thing in theIdea, which was not in itscause, it must of necessity have this fromnothing; but (tho it be a mostImperfect mannerofexisting, by which the thing isobjectivelyin theIntellectby anIdea, yet) it is notaltogether nothing, and therefore cannot proceed fromnothing.

Neither ought I to doubt, seeing thereallitywhich I perceive in myIdeasis only anobjective reallity, that therefore it must of necessity follow, that the samereallityshould be in thecausesof theseIdeas formally. But I may conclude, that ’tis sufficient that thisreallitybe in the verycausesonlyobjectively. For as thatobjectivemannerofbeingappertains to the verynatureof anIdea, so thatformal mannerofbeingappertains to the verynatureof acauseofIdeas, at least to thefirstandchiefest causesof them; For tho perhaps oneIdeamay receive its birth from an other, yet we cannot proceed inInfinitum, but at last we must arrive at somefirst Idea, whosecauseis (as it were) anOriginal copy, in which all theobjective reallityof theIdeaisformally contain’d. So that I plainly discover by thelightofnature, that theIdeas, which are in me, are (as it were)Pictures, which may easilycome shortof theperfectionof those things from whence they are taken, but cannotcontainany thinggreaterormore perfectthen them: And thelongerandmore diligentlyI pry into these things, so much the moreclearlyanddistinctlydo I discover them to betrue.

But what shall I conclude from hence? Thus, that if theobjective reallityof any of myIdeasbesuch, that it cannot be in me eitherformallyoreminently, and that therefore I cannot be thecauseofthat Idea, from hence it necessarily Follows, thatI alonedo not onlyexist, but that some otherthing, which iscauseof thatIdea, doesexist also.

But if I can find nosuch Ideain me, I have no argument to perswade me of theexistenceof any thing besides my self for I have diligently enquired, and hitherto I could discover no otherperswasive.

Some of theseIdeasthere are (besides that which representsmy selftomy self, of which in this place I cannot doubt) which represent to me, one of them aGod, others of themCorporealandInanimatethings, some of themAngels, othersAnimals, and lastly some of them which exhibite to memen like my self.

As touching those that representMenorAngelsorAnimals, I easily understand that they may bemade upof thoseIdeaswhich I have ofmy self, ofCorporealthings, and ofGod, tho there were neitherman(but my self) norAngel, norAnimalin being.

And as to theIdeasofCorporealthings, I find nothing in them of thatperfection, but it may proceed from my self; for if I look into them more narrowly, and examine them more particularly, as yesterday (in the second Medit.) I did theIdeaofWax, I find there are but few things which I perceiveclearlyanddistinctlyin them, viz.MagnitudeorextensioninLongitude,Latitude, andProfundity, theFigureorshapewhich arises from theterminationof thatExtension, thePositionorplacewhich diversFigured Bodieshave inrespectof each other, theirmotionorchange of place; to which may be added, theirsubstance,continuance, andnumber; as to the other, such as are,Light,Colours,Sounds,Smels,Tasts,Heat, andCold, with the othertactile qualities, I have but veryobscureandconfused thoughtsof them, so that I know not, whether they aretrueorfalse, that is to say, whether theIdeasI have of them are theIdeasofthingswhichreally are, orare not. For althofalshood formallyandproperlyso called, consists only in thejudgement(as before I have observed) yet there is an other sort ofmaterial falshoodinIdeas, when they represent athingasreally existent, tho it doesnot exist; so, for example, theIdeasI have ofheatandcoldare soobscureandconfused, that I cannot collect from them, whethercoldbe aprivationofheat, orheataprivationofcold, or whethereither of them be areal quality, or whether neither of them bereal. And since everyIdeamust belikethe thing it represents, if it betruethatcoldis nothing but theprivationofheat, thatIdeawhich represents it to me as a thingrealandpositivemay deservedly be calledfalse. The same may be apply’d to other Ideas.

And now I see no necessity why I should assigne any otherAuthorof theseIdeasbutmy self; for if they arefalse, that is, represent things thatare not, I know by thelightofnaturethat they proceed fromnothing; that is to say, I harbour them upon no other account, but because mynatureisdeficientin something, andimperfect. But if they aretrue, yet seeing I discover so littlerealityin them, that that veryrealityscarceseemstobe realy, I see no reason why I my self should not be theAuthorof them.

But also some of those veryIdeasofCorporealthings which areclearanddistinct, I may seem to have borrow’d from theIdeaI have ofmy self, viz.Substance,duration,number, and the like; For when I conceive astoneto be asubstance(that is,a thing apt of it self to exist) and also that Imy selfam asubstance, tho I conceivemy selfathinking substanceandnot extended, and thestoneanextended substanceandnot thinking, by which there is a greatdiversitybetween both theconceptions, yet theyagreein this, that they areboth substances. So when I conceive my self asnowin being, and also remember, thatheretoforeIhave been; and since I havediversthoughts, which I cannumberorcount; from hence it is that I come by the notions ofdurationandnumber; which afterwards I apply to other things.

As to those other things, of which theIdeaof abodyis made up, asextension,figure,placeandmotion, they are notformallyin me, seeing I am only athinking thing; yet seeing they are only certainmodesofsubstance, and I my self also am asubstance, they may seem to be in meeminently.

*Wherefore there only Remains theIdeaof aGod, wherein I must consider whether there be not something included, which cannot possibly have itsoriginalfrom me. By the wordGod, I mean acertainInfinite Substance,Independent,Omniscient,Almighty, by whom bothI my self, and every thing else thatis(if any thing doActualy exist) was created. All whichAttributesare of such anhigh nature, that the more attentively I consider them, the less I conceive my self possible to be theAuthorof these notions.

From what therefore has been said I must conclude that there is aGod; for tho theIdeaofsubstancemay arise in me, because that I my self am asubstance, yet I could not have theIdeaof anInfinite substance(seeing I my self amfinite) unless it proceeded from asubstancewhich isreally Infinite. Neither ought I to think that I have notrue IdeaofInfinity, or that I perceive it only by thenegationof what isfinite, as I conceiverestanddarknessby thenegationorabsenceofmotionorlight. But on the contrary I plainly understand, that there ismore realityin anInfinite substance, then in aFinite; and that therefore theperceptionof anInfinite(asGod) isantecedentto thenotionI have of afinite(asmy self). For how should I know that Idoubtordesire, that is to say, that Iwantsomething, and that I amnotaltogether perfect, unless I had theIdeaof abeing more perfectthenmy self, bycomparingmy self to which I may discover my ownImperfections.

Neither can it be said that thisIdeaofGodisfalse Materialiter, and that therefore itproceedsfromnothing, as before I observed of theIdeasofheatandcold,&c.For on the contrary, seeing thisnotionis mostclearanddistinct, and contains in it self moreobjective realitythen any otherIdea, none can be moretruein it self, nor in which lesssuspitionoffalshoodcan be found. ThisIdea(I say) of abeing infinitely perfectis mosttrue, for tho it may be supposed that such abeingdoesnot exist, yet it cannot be supposed that theIdeaof such abeingexhibites to me nothingreal, as before I have said of theIdeaofcold. ThisIdeaalso is mostclearanddistinct, for whatever I perceiveclearlyanddistinctlyto bereal, andtrue, andperfect, is wholycontain’din thisIdeaofGod.

Neither can it be objected, that I cannotcomprehendanInfinite, or that there are innumerable other things inGod, which I can neitherconceive, nor in the leastthink upon; for it is of thevery natureof anInfinitenot to beapprehendablebymewho amfinite. And ’tis sufficient to me to prove this myIdeaofGodto be the mosttrue, the mostclear, and the mostdistinct Ideaof all thoseIdeasI have, upon thisaccount, that I understand thatGodisnot to be understood, and that I judge that whatever Iclearlyperceive and knowImplysanyperfection, as also perhaps other innumerableperfections, which I am ignorant of, are inGodeitherformallyoreminently.

Doubt.But perhapsI amsomethingmorethen I take my self tobe, and perhaps all theseperfectionswhich I attribute toGod, arepotentiallyin me, tho at present they do not shew themselves, and break into action. For I am now fully experienced that myKnowledgemay beencreased, and I see nothing that hinders why it may notencreaseby degrees inInfinitum, nor why by myknowledgesoencreasedI may not attain to the otherperfectionsofGod; nor lastly, why thepoweroraptitudeofhavingthese perfections may not be sufficient to produce theIdeaof them inme.

Solution.But none of these will do;for first, tho it be true that myKnowledgeis capable of beingincreased, and that many things are in mepotentially, whichactuallyare not, yet none of these go to the making anIdeaofGod, in which I conceive nothingpotentially, for tis a certain argument ofimperfectionthat a thingmay be encreased Gradually. Moreover, tho my knowledge may bemoreandmore encreased, yet I know that it can never beactually Infinite, for it can never arrive to thatheightofperfection, which admits not of anhigher degree. But I conceive God to beactuallysoInfinite, that nothing can beaddedto hisperfections. And lastly, I perceive that theobjective beingof anIdeacannot beproducedonly by thepotential beingof athing(which in proper speech isnothing) but requires anactualorformal beingto itsproduction.

Of all which forementioned things there is nothing that is notevidentby thelightofreasonto any one that will diligently consider them. Yet because that (when I am careless, and theImagesofsensiblethingsblindmyunderstanding) I do not so easily call to mind the reasons, why theIdeaof abeing more perfectthenmy selfshould of necessity proceed from abeingwhich isreally more perfect; It will be requisite to enquire further, whetherI, who have thisIdea, can possiblybe, unlesssuchabeingdidexist. To which end let me aske,from whenceshould Ibe? Frommy self? or from myParents? or from any other thingless perfectthenGod? for nothing can be thought or supposedmore perfect, orequally perfectwithGod.

But first, IfIwere from my self, I should neitherdoubt, nordesire, norwantany thing, for I should have given my self all thoseperfections, of which I have anyIdea, and consequently I my self should beGod; and I cannot think that those things Iwant, are to be acquired withgreater difficultythen those things Ihave; but on the contrary, ’tis manifest, that it were much moredifficultthatI(that is,a substancethatthinks) shouldariseout ofnothing, then that I shouldacquiretheknowledgeof many things whereof I amIgnorant, which is only theaccidentof thatsubstance. And certainly if I had thatgreater thing(vizbeing) from my self, I should not havedenyedmy self (not only, those things which may be easier acquired,but also) All those things, which I perceived are contain’d in theIdeaof aGod; and the reason is, for that no other thingsseemto me to bemore difficultlydone, and certainly if they wereReally more difficult, they wouldseemmoredifficultto me (if whateverI have, Ihavefrom my self) for in those things I should find myPowerput to a stop.

Neither can I Evade the force of these Arguments by supposing my self tohave alwaies Been, what now I am, and that therefore I need not seek for anAuthorof myBeing. For theDurationorContinuanceof my life may bedividedintoInnumerable Parts, each of which does not at alldependon theOther Parts; Therefore it will not follow, that becausea while ago, I was, I must of necessitynow Be. I say, this will not follow, Unless, I suppose someCausetoCreate me(as it were)anewforthisMoment (that is,Conserve me). For ’tis evident to one that Considers the Nature ofDuration, that the samePowerandActionis requisite to theConservationof a Thing eachMomentof itsBeing, as there is to theCreationof that Thinganew, if it didnot exist. So that ’tis oneof thosePrincipleswhich areEvidentby theLightofNature: that theActofConservationdiffers onlyRatione(as the Philosophers term it) from theAct of Creation.

Wherefore I ought to ask my self this Question, whetherI, whonowAm; have anyPowertoCausemy self toBe hereafter? (for had I any suchpower, I should certainlyknowof it, seeing I am nothing but aThinking Thing, or at least at present I onely treat of that part of me, which is aThingthatThinks) to which, I answer, that I can discover no suchPowerin Me; And consequently, I evidently know thatI dependon someOther being distinctfrommy self.

But what ifIsay that perhaps thisBeingis notGod, but thatIam produced either by myParents, or some otherCauses less perfectthenGod? In answer to which let me consider (asIhave said before) that ’tismanifestthat whatever is in theeffect, so muchat least ought to be in thecause; and therefore seeingIam a thing thatthinks, and have in me anIdeaofGod, it will confessedly follow, that whatever sort ofcauseI assign of myown Being, italso must be aThinking Thing, and must have anIdeaof all thosePerfections, which I attribute toGod; Of whichCauseit may be again Asked, whether it befrom it self, or from any otherCause? Iffrom it self, ’tis evident (from what has been said) that it must beGod; For seeing it has thePowerofExisting of it self, without doubt it has also thepowerofactually Possessingall thosePerfectionswhereof it has anIdeain it self, that is, all thosePerfectionswhich I conceive inGod. But if it Be from another Cause, it may again be asked of thatCausewhether it beof it self, or from another; Till at length We arrive at theLast Causeof All, Which will BeGod. For ’tis evident, that thisEnquirywill not admit ofProgressus in Infinitum, especially when at Present I treat not only of that Cause which atfirst madeMe; But chiefly of that whichconservesme in thisInstanttime.

Neither can it be supposed that manypartial Causeshaveconcurredto the making Me, and that I received theIdeaof one ofGods perfectionsfromOneof them, and from anotherof them theIdeaof another; and that therefore allthese Perfections are to be foundscatteredin the World, but not all of themJoyn’din any one which may BeGod. For on the contrary,Unity,Simplicity, or theinseparabilityof All Gods Attributes is one of thechief Perfectionswhich I conceive in Him; and certainly theIdeaof theUnityof theDivine Perfectionscould not becreatedin me by any othercause, then byThat, from whence I have received theIdeasof his otherperfections; For ’tis Impossible to make me conceive theseperfections,conjunctandinseparable, unless he should also make me know whatperfectionstheseare.

Lastly as touching myhavingmyBeingfrom myParents. Tho whatever Thoughts I have heretofore harbour’d of Them wereTrue, yet certainly theycontributenothing to myconservation, neither proceed I from them asI amaThingthatThinks, for they have onelypredisposedthatmaterial Thing, whereinI, that is,my mind(whichonly at present I take formy self)Inhabits. Wherefore I cannotnowQuestion that I am sprung from them. But I must of necessity conclude that becauseI am, and because I have anIdeaof aBeing most perfect, that is, ofGod, it evidently follows thatthere is a God.

*Now it only remains for me to examine, how I have received thisIdeaofGod. For I have neither received it bymeansofmy Senses, neither comes it to mewithoutmyForethought, as theIdeasofsensiblethings use to do, when such thingsWorkon the Organs of mySense, or at leastseemso to work; Neither is thisIdeaframed bymy self, for I can neitherdetract from, noraddany thingthereto. Wherefore I have only to conclude that it isInnate, even as theIdeaof memy selfisNaturalto my self.

And truly ’tis not to be Admired thatGodin Creating me shouldImprintthisIdeain me, that it may there remain as astamp impressedby theWorkman GodonmehisWork, neither is it requisite that thisstampshould be a Thingdifferentfrom theWorkit self, but ’tis very Credible (from hence only thatGod Createdme) that I am made as it were according to hislikenessandImage, and that the samelikeness, in which theIdeaof God is contain’d, isperceivedby Me with thesame faculty, with which Iperceive my Self;That is to say, whilstI reflectupon my self,Ido not onlyperceivethat I am anImperfectthing, having mydependanceupon some other thing, and that I am a Thing that DesiresmoreandbetterthingsIndefinitely; But also at the same time I understand, thatHeon whom Idependcontains in him all thosewish’d for things(not onlyIndefinitelyandPotentially, but)Really,Indefinitely; and that therefore he isGod. The whole stress of which*Argument lies thus, because I know it Impossible for Me to Be of the same Nature I am,Viz.Having theIdeaof aGodin me, unless really there were aGod, aGod(I say) that verysame God, whoseIdea Ihave in myMind(that is, Having all thoseperfections, which I cannotcomprehend, but can as it werethink upon them) and who is notsubjectto anyDefects.

By which ’tis evident thatGodis noDeceiver; for ’tis manifest by theLightofNature, that allfraudanddeceitdepends on somedefect. But before I prosecute this any farther, or pry into otherTrutheswhich may be deduced from this, I am willing here to stop, and dwell upon the Contemplation of thisGod, toConsider with my self HisDivine Attributes, to behold, admire, and adore the Loveliness of thisImmense light, as much as possibly I am able to accomplish with mydarkUnderstanding. For as byFaithwebelievethat the greatesthappinessof thenext Lifeconsists alone in theContemplationof theDivine Majesty, so wefindbyExperiencethat now we receive from thence the greatestpleasure, whereof we are capable inthis Life; Tho it be much moreImperfectthen that in theNext.