By yesterdays Meditation I am cast into so greatDoubts, that I shall never forget them, and yet I know not how to answer them, but being plunged on a suddain into a deep Gulf, I am so amazed that I can neither touch the bottome, nor swim at the top.

Nevertheless, I will endeavour once more, and try the way I set on yesterday, by removing from me whatever is in theleast doubtful, as if I had certainly discover’d it to bealtogether false, and will proceed till I find out somecertainty, or if nothing else, yet at least thiscertainty, That there is nothing sure.

Archimedesrequired but apointwhich wasfirm, andimmoveablethat he might move thewhole Earth, so in the perfect undertaking Great things may be expected,if I can discover but theleast thingthat istrueandindisputable.

Wherefore I suppose all things I see arefalse, and believe that nothing of those things are really existent, which my deceitful memory represents to me; ’tis evident I have no senses, that a Body, Figure, Extension, Motion, Place,&c.are meer Fictions; what thing therefore is there that istrue? perhaps onlythis, That there is nothing certain.

But how know I that there is nothingdistinctfrom all these things (which I have now reckon’d) of which I have no reason todoubt? Is there noGod(or whatever other name I may call him) who has put these thoughts into me? Yet why should I think this? When I my self perhaps am theAuthorof them. Upon which Account, therefore must not I be something? ’tis but just now that I denied that I had anysenses, or anyBody. Hold a while—Am I so tied to aBodyandsensesthat I cannotexistwithout them? But I have perswaded my self that there is nothing in the World, no Heaven, no Earth, no Souls, no Bodies; and then why not, that Imy self am not?Yet surely ifIcould perswade my self any thing,I was.

But there isIknow not what sort ofDeceivourverypowerfuland verycrafty, who always strives todeceiveMe; without Doubt thereforeI am, if he candecieve me; And let himDeceiveme as much as he can, yet he can never make menot to Be, whilstI think that I am. WhereforeImay lay this down as aPrinciple, that whenever this sentence I am, I exist, is spoken or thought of by Me, ’tis necessarily True.

ButIdo not yet fully understandwho I amthat now necessarilyexist, andImust hereafter take care, leastIfoolishlymistakesome other thingfor my self, and by that means bedeceivedin that thought, whichIdefend as the mostcertainandevidentof all.

WhereforeIwill again Recollect, whatIbelievedmy self to beheretofore, beforeIhad set upon these Meditations, from whichNotion Iwill withdraw whatever may beDisprovedby theForemention’d Reasons, that in the End,Thatonly may Remain which isTrueandindisputable.

What therefore have I heretofore thought my self?A Man.But what is a man? Shall I answer, aRational Animal? By no means; because afterwards it may be asked, what anAnimalis? and whatRationalis? And so from onequestionI may fall into greaterDifficulties; neither at present have I so much time as to spend it about such Niceties.

But I shall rather here Consider, what heretofore represented it self to my thoughtsfreely, andnaturally, whenever I set my self to understandWhat I my self was.

And the first thing I find Representing it self is, that I haveFace,Hands,Arms, and this wholeframeofpartswhich is seen in myBody, and which I call myBody.

The next thing represented to me was, that I wasnourish’d, couldwalk, hadsenses, and couldThink; which functions I attributed to mySoul. Yet what thissoulof mine was, I did not fully conceive; or else supposed it a small thing likewind, orfire, oraire, infused through mystronger parts.

As to myBodytrulyIdoubted not,but thatIrightly understood itsNature, which (ifIshould endeavour to describe asIconceive it)Ishould thus Explain,viz.By aBodyImean whatever iscapableofShape, or can becontainedin aplace, and so fill’s a space that it excludes all otherBodysout of the same, that which may betouch’d,seen,heard,tasted, orsmelt, and that which iscapableofvariousMotionsandModifications, not from itself, but from anyother thing movingit, forIjudged itagainst(or ratherabove) thenatureof aBodytomove it self, orperceive, orthink, But rather admired thatIshould find theseOperationsin certainBodys.

But How now (sinceIsuppose a certainpowerfuland (if it be lawful to call him so)evil deluder, who useth all his endeavours to deceive me in all things) canIaffirme that I have any of those things, which I have now said belong to thenatureof aBody? Hold— Let me Consider—, Let me think—, Let me reflect— I can find no Answer, and I am weary with repeating the same things over-again in vain.

But Which of theseFacultiesdid I attribute to mySoul, myNutritive, orMotive faculty? yet now seeing I have noBody, these also aremeer delusions. Was it mysensitive faculty? But this also cannot be perform’d without aBody, and I have seem’d toperceivemany things in mysleep, of which I afterwards understood my selfnotto besensible. Was it myCogitative Faculty? Here I have discovered it, ’tis myThought, this alone cannot be separated from Me, Iam, Iexist,⸺tis true, but for what timeAm I? WhyI amas long asI think; For it May be that When I cease fromthinking, I may cease from being. Now I admit of nothing but what is necessarily true: In short therefore Iamonly athinking thingthat is to say, amind, or asoul, orunderstanding, orReason, words which formerlyIunderstood not; I am aReal thing, andReally Existent, But what sort of thing? I have just now said it,A thinking thing.

But am I nothing besides? I will consider⸺I am not thatstructureofparts, which is called a MansBody, neither am Iany sort ofthin Airinfused into those Parts, nor aWind, norFire, norVapour, norBreath, nor whatever I my self can feign, for all these things I have supposednot to Be. Yet my Position stands firm;Nevertheless I am something.Yet perhaps it so falls out that these very things which I suppose not to exist (because to meunknown) are in reallity nothingdifferentfrom that verySelf, which Iknow. I cannot tell, I dispute it not now, I can only give my opinion of those things whereof I have some knowledge. I am sure that I exist, I ask who I am whom I thus know, certainly, the knowledge, ofMe(precisely taken) depends not on those things, whose existence I am yet ignorant of; and therefore not on any other things that I canfeignby myimagination.

And this very Word (feign) puts me in mind of myerror, for I shouldfeignin deed, if I shouldimaginemy self any thing; for toimagineis nothing else but to think upon theshapeorimageof acorporealthing; but now I certainly know that Iam, and I know also that ’tis possible that all theseimages, and generallywhatever belongs to theNatureof aBodyare nothing butdeluding Dreams. Which things Consider’d I should be no less Foolish in saying,I will imagine that I may more throughly understand what I am, then if I should say,at Present I am awake and perceive something true, but because it appears not evidently enough, I shall endeavour to sleep, that in a Dream I may perceive it more evidently and truely.

Wherefore I know that nothing that I can comprehend by myimagination, can belong to theNotionI have ofmy self, and that I must carefully withdraw my mind from those things that it may moredistinctlyperceive itsown Nature.

Let me ask thereforeWhat I am, A Thinking Thing, but What is That? That is a thing,doubting,understanding,affirming,denying,willing,nilling,imaginingalso, andsensitive. These truely are not a fewProperties, if they all belong to Me. And Why should they Not belong to me? For am not I the very same who at presentdoubtalmost of All things; yetunderstandsomething, which thing onely Iaffirmto be true, Idenyall other things, I amwillingto know more, Iwould notbe deceived, Iimaginemany thingsunwillingly, andconsidermany things as coming to me by mysenses. Which of all these faculties is it, which is not astrueas that IExist, tho I shouldsleep, or myCreatourshould as much as in him lay, strive todeceiveMe? which of them is it that isdistinctfrom mythought? which of them is it that can beseperatedfromme? For that I am the same thatdoubt,understand, andwillis soevident, that I know not how to explain it moremanifestly, and that I also am the same thatimagine, for tho perhaps (as I have supposed) no thing that can beimaginedistrue, yet theimaginative Powerit self isreallyexistent, and makes up a part of myThought; and last of all that I am the same that amsensitive, orperceive corporealthings as by mysenses, yet that I nowseelight,heara noise,feelheat, these things are false, for I suppose my selfasleep, but Iknowthat Isee,hear, and amheated, that cannot befalse; and this it is that in me isproperlycalledSense, and this strictly taken is the same withthought.

By these Considerations I begin a little better tounderstand My selfwhat I am; But yet itseems, and I cannot butthinkthatCorporeal Things(whoseImagesare formed in mythought, and which by mysenses, I perceive) are much moredistinctly known, then thatconfused NotionofMy Selfwhichimaginationcannot afford me. And yet ’tis strange that thingsdoubtful,unknown,distinct from Me, should beapprehendedmoreclearlybyMe, then a Thing that isTrue, then a thing that isknown, or thenI my self; But the Reason is, that my Mind loves to wander, and suffers not it self to be bounded within the strict limits ofTruth.

Let it therefore Wander, and once more let me give it the Free Reins, that hereafter being conveniently curbed, it may suffer it self to be more easily Govern’d.

Let me consider those things which of all Things I formerly conceived mostevident, that is to say,Bodieswhich we touch, which we see, not bodies in General (for thoseGeneralConceptions are usuallyConfused) but some oneBodyin particular.

Let us chuse for example this piece ofBees-wax, it was lately taken from theComb, it has not yet lost all thetastoftheHoney, it retains something of thesmellof theFlowersfrom whence ’twas gather’d, itscolour,shape, andbignessare manifest, ’tishard, ’tiscold, ’tiseasily felt, and if you will knock it with your finger, ’twillmake a noise: In fine, it hath all things requisite to the most perfect notion of aBody.

But behold whilst I am speaking, ’tis put to the Fire, itstastis purged away, thesmellis vanish’d, thecolouris changed, theshapeis alter’d, itsbulkis increased, its becomesoft, ’tishot, it can scarce befelt, and now (though you strike it) it makes nonoise. Does it yet continue the same Wax? surely it does, this all confess, no one denies it, no one doubts it. What therefore was there in it that was so evidently known? surely none of those things which Iperceivedby mysenses; for what Ismelt,tasted, haveseen,felt, orheard, are allvanish’d, and yet theWax remains. Perhaps ’twas this only that I now think on,viz.that theWaxit self was not thattast of Honey, thatsmell of Flowers, thatwhiteness, thatshape, or thatsound, but it was aBodywhich awhile before appear’d to mesoandso modified, but nowotherwise. But what is it strictly that I thus imagine? let me consider: And having rejected whatever belongs not to the Wax, let me see what will remain,viz.this only, athing extended,flexible, andmutable. But what is thisflexible, andmutable? is it that Iimaginethat this Wax from beingroundmay be madesquare, or from beingsquarecan be madetriangular? No, this is not it; for I conceive it capable ofinnumerablesuchchanges, and yet I cannot by myimaginationrun over theseInnumerables; Wherefore this notion of itsmutabilityproceeds not from myimagination. What then isextended? is not itsExtensionalsounknown? For when itmelts’tisgreater, when itboils’tisgreater, and yetgreaterwhen the heat is increas’d; and I should not rightly judge of the Wax, did I not think it capable of more variousExtensionsthan I canimagine. It remains therefore for me only to confess, that I cannotimaginewhat this Wax is, but that Iperceivewith myMindwhat it is. I speak of thisparticularWax, for of Wax ingeneralthenotionis moreclear.

But what Wax is this that I only conceiveby my mind? ’Tis the same which I see, which I touch, which I imagine, and in fine, the same which at first I judged it to be. But this is to be noted, that theperceptionthereof is notsight, thetouch, or theimaginationthereof; neither was it ever so, though at first it seem’d so. But theperceptionthereof is theinspectionorbeholdingof the Mind only, which may be eitherimperfectandconfused, as formerly it was; orclearanddistinct, as now it is; themoreor thelessI consider the Composition of the Wax.

In the interim, I cannot but admire how prone my mind is to erre; for though I revolve these things with my selfsilently, andwithout speaking, yet am I intangled inmeer words, and am almost deceived by the usual way ofexpression; for we commonly say,that we see the Wax it self if it be present, and not,that we judge it present by its colour or shape; from whence I should immediately thus conclude, therefore the Wax is known by thesightof theeye, and not by theinspectionof themindonly. Thus I should have concluded, had not I by chance look’d out of my window, and seen menpassing by in the Street; which men I as usually say that Isee, as I do now, that Iseethis Wax; and yet I see nothing but their Hair and Garments, which perhaps may cover onlyartificial Machinesandmovements, but I judge them to be men; so that what I thought I onlysawwith my eyes, I comprehend by myJudicative Faculty, which ismy Soul. But it becomes not one, who desires to be wiser than the Vulgar, to draw matter ofdoubtfrom those ways ofexpression, which the Vulgar have invented.

Wherefore let us proceed and consider, whether I perceived moreperfectlyandevidentlywhat the Wax was, when I first look’d on’t, and believed that I knew it by my outwardsenses, or at least by mycommon sense(as they call it) that is to say,by my imagination; or whether at present Ibetter understandit, after I have more diligently enquired bothwhat it is, and how it may beknown. Surely it would be a foolish thing to make it matter of doubt to know which of these parts are true; What was there in my firstperceptionthat wasdistinct?What was there that seem’d not incident to everyother Animal? But now when I distinguish the Wax from its outward adherents, and consider it as if it were naked, with it’s coverings pull’d off, then I cannot but really perceive it with my mind, though yet perhaps my judgment may erre.

But what shall I now say as to mymind, or myself? (for as yet I admit nothing as belonging to me but amind.) Why (shall I say?) should not I, who seem to perceive this Wax sodistinctly, know myselfnot only moretrulyand morecertainly, but moredistinctlyandevidently? For if I judge thatthis Wax exists, because Iseethis Wax; surely it will be much moreevident, that Imy self exist, becauseI see this Wax; for it may be that this that I see is not really Wax, also it may be that I have no eyes wherewith to see any thing; but it cannot be, when Isee, or (which is the same thing) whenI think that I see, that I whothinkshould notexist. The same thing will follow if Ijudge that this Wax exists, because Itouch, orimagineit, &c. And what has been said of Wax, may be apply’d to all other outward things.

Moreover, if thenotionof Wax seems moredistinctafter it is made known to me, not only by mysightortouch, but by more and other causes; How much the moredistinctlymust I confess myself knownunto myself, seeing that all sort of reasoning which furthers me in theperceptionofWax, or any otherBody, does also encrease the proofs of thenatureof myMind. But there are so many more things in the veryMindit self, by which thenotionof it may be made moredistinct, that those things which drawn fromBodyconduce to its knowledge are scarce to bemention’d.

And now behold of my own accord am I come to the place I would be in; for seeing I have now discover’d thatBodies themselvesare notproperly perceivedby oursensesorimagination, but only by ourunderstanding, and are not thereforeperceived, because they arefeltorseen, but because they areunderstood; it plainly appears to me, that nothing can possibly beperceivedbyme easier, or moreevidently, than myMind.

But because I cannot so soon shake off the Acquaintance of my former Opinion,I am willing to stop here, that this my new knowledge may be better fixt in my memory the longer I meditate thereon.